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The tax treatment of housing has been a subject of continuing debate in the UK, 
as in many other countries. Economists have often pointed to the exclusion of 
imputed income from owner-occupation from the income tax base as a major 
distortion. As a result, a tax on the imputed income of owner-occupiers has been 
one of the perennial suggestions for ‘root-and-branch’ reform of the tax 
treatment of housing. But there has been a dearth of empirical analysis of the 
distributional effects of such proposals.
1 This paper aims to fill that gap. Thus it 
models the distributional effects of taxation of imputed rental income, and of 
some proxies to such a tax. 
The distributional effects of a tax on imputed rental income depend in large 
part on the use which is made of that revenue, in terms of increased public 
expenditures or reductions in other taxes. Earlier analysis of the option of taxing 
imputed rental income (King, 1983) considered distributional effects in the 
context of a revenue-neutral lump-sum subsidy. Here the focus is instead on 
some more realistic tax-cutting packages. Two main types of analysis are 
conducted. The first is a revenue-neutral reduction in national income tax rates, 
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in line with the logic of arguments for a comprehensive income tax, with lower 
tax rates on a broader base. Second, the traditional link between taxes based on 
property and local authority finance suggests consideration of a tax on imputed 
income sufficient to allow the abolition of a poll tax along the lines of the UK 
Community Charge; comparison with the actual replacement for the poll tax, the 
new Council Tax, recently analysed by Hills and Sutherland (1991), is also of 
interest. 
The second type of analysis is still conducted at national level. It abstracts 
from many other issues which arise in the context of local taxes
2 in order to 
focus more closely on the issues related to the structure of the taxes themselves. 
It provides an alternative perspective on the distributional impact of a tax on 
imputed rental income, which could arise under different assignments of 
revenues to local and national authorities. It should be noted, however, that 
‘Many of the desired housing market effects of a reform ... would work only if 
they were imposed nationally, uniformly, and with some degree of certainty as to 
their magnitude’.
3 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the basic policy options 
to be analysed are set out. Section III outlines the data and methods used in 
analysing these options in an Irish setting. Section IV examines the first-round 
distributional effects of a tax on imputed income, with revenues being used 
either to reduce the national income tax, or to provide national revenues which 
would allow elimination of the poll tax, the results of which are compared with 
those for a council tax. The degree to which a national residential property tax 
could proxy for an imputed income tax is also considered. The main findings are 
drawn together in the final section. 
II. ALTERNATIVE TAXES ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 
The most fundamental reform considered here is the taxation of imputed income 
from owner occupation (an imputed income tax). The economic case for taxation 
of owner-occupiers’ imputed rental income has been strongly argued by King 
and Atkinson (1980), Fender (1986), Muellbauer (1987) and Ball (1990) among 
others. The basic thrust of the argument is that owner-occupiers derive an 
income from their property which, since the abolition of Schedule A in 1963, is 
not subject to income tax. This makes it more attractive to receive income in this 
form than in other forms, which tends to distort decisions about housing tenure, 
and the size and quality of housing. Inclusion of imputed income from owner-
occupation in the income tax base would represent a significant move towards a 
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comprehensive income tax. While second-best considerations preclude any 
general guarantee that a move towards comprehensive income tax will reduce the 
dead-weight loss from taxation, it seems likely that a positive tax rate on imputed 
rental income would improve efficiency (cf. Rosen, 1985). 
Despite the strengths of the theoretical case for taxation of imputed rental 
income, there has been little empirical analysis of such proposals. King (1983) 
explored the first-round effects of a tax on imputed income, coupled with a 
revenue-neutral lump-sum subsidy, and went on to consider the impact of 
behavioural responses to changes in housing costs. He estimated that 54 per cent 
of households would gain in cash terms from the reform he specified, but that 
when behavioural responses were taken into account, efficiency gains resulted in 
gains for a greater number of households - about 61 per cent. However, the 
distributional effects in terms of ‘cash gains’ (first-round effects) and ‘equivalent 
gains’ (first- and second-round effects) were not dissimilar. 
In common with most studies of distributional impact, King’s analysis is 
based on a ranking of households in terms of cash income. But the logic of the 
economic case for a tax on imputed rent suggests that its distributional effects, 
and, indeed, those of other taxes, cannot be adequately analysed in terms of cash 
income alone; it is necessary to consider, in addition, the distributional effects in 
terms of a wider income concept, incorporating the imputed income from owner-
occupation. This is of particular relevance to other taxes incorporating a property 
tax element, such as the Council Tax in the UK. The framework used in the 
present analysis is therefore also used to provide new insights not only into the 
imputed income tax, but also into the distributional effects of the council tax 
analysed by Hills and Sutherland (1991). 
How is the imputed income for owner-occupiers to be calculated? A number 
of approaches are possible, but those involving a fixed rate of return have 
considerable advantages over alternatives which require the identification at 
local level of appropriate comparators in a restricted rental market. A further 
choice has then to be made between taxation of the real returns, net of real 
mortgage interest, or nominal returns, net of nominal mortgage interest. As 
Muellbauer (1987) points out, the use of net equity as a tax base would be 
desirable in the context of a comprehensive reform in which only real returns on 
various investments were taxed; but without such a reform, neutrality would be 
better served by keeping a system of tax relief on nominal mortgage interest. The 
difference between these two approaches is considered in the context of 
residential property taxes proxying an imputed income tax, outlined below. But 
the imputed income tax considered here is based on a real return to housing 
equity net of mortgage debt (equivalent to giving relief on mortgage debt at that 
real rate of interest). Thus ‘total’ income is defined as: 
‘Total’ income = Cash income + (Gross house value – Mortgage 
outstanding) × Rate of return. Taxing Imputed Income from Owner-Occupation 
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The final question to be decided is then what real rate of return is to be 
applied to housing equity to derive the imputed income from owner-occupation. 
Miles (1992) suggests that a rate of between 4 and 7 per cent would be 
conservative. Here income is imputed at the rate of 5 per cent for purposes of 
determining the true income from owner-occupation and obtaining a ranking of 
incomes using the ‘total’ income concept. 
A number of forms of property tax have been proposed as proxies for 
imputed rent, which might be administratively or politically more tractable. Two 
such proxies are also considered here: a tax on the gross value of owner-
occupied property, with mortgage interest relief being retained; and a tax on the 
net equity stake held by owner-occupiers in their property, with mortgage 
interest relief being abolished. They are referred to respectively as a gross 
property (equity) tax and net property (equity) tax. They are designed to gain 
additional revenue only from owner-occupied property.
4 In practice, either gross 
or net property tax might be applied as a withholding tax or tax on the notional 
rental income of owners of rented property, to encourage efficiency in the use of 
property; actual income tax on rental income would then take into account any 
prepayment through a property tax of this kind. As noted above, the difference 
between these two taxes is similar to the difference between ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ 
imputed income taxes, as proposed by Fender (1986) and Muellbauer (1987) 
respectively. 
The structure of the poll tax must also be defined in order to examine the 
distributive impact of a revenue-neutral package involving the use of revenues 
from imputed income or property taxes to abolish the poll tax. The structure of 
the UK poll tax is a simple one: a set charge for each adult individual, with a 
very small number of exceptions. Income-related rebates were provided to those 
on low incomes (on or below the income support rate, the safety net provided by 
the social security system); and these rebates were withdrawn at a rate of 15 per 
cent for those on somewhat higher incomes. The maximum rebate under the UK 
Community Charge had been 80 per cent, but in order to provide a baseline 
which abstracts from changes in the rebate scheme with the introduction of the 
Council Tax, Hills and Sutherland (1991) used a 100 per cent rebate in their 
calculations. This structure has been followed here, and the same rebate scheme 
has been used in the modelling of the council tax and the gross and net property 
taxes. 
The analysis also considers a tax with the same structure as the UK Council 
Tax, which provides for a household-level tax related to the value of the 
property, through a system of property value bands. Taking the bill for a property 
close to the average value as a standard, the bill as a proportion of that standard 
rises from 67 per cent for a household in band A (less than 50 per cent of the 
average property value), to 167 per cent for a household in band G (over 200 per 
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cent of the average value).
5 Hills and Sutherland note that ‘roughly speaking, 
therefore, the percentage rise in bills between the bands is half the percentage 
rise in property values’. This feature combines a ‘dampening’, ‘flattening’ or 
‘tilting’ of the relationship between tax levels and capital values; and a ‘ceiling’ 
on the maximum payment. Council Tax may be reduced by two factors. First, 
single-person households are eligible for a personal discount of 25 per cent.
6 
Second, there are rebates, again related to income support levels, and with a 
rebate withdrawal rate of 15 per cent. 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
The empirical modelling of these options is undertaken on an Irish data set, the 
ESRI’s 1987 Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State 
Services. This survey of 3,300 households included detailed information on 
incomes, together with self-assessed estimates of the capital value of the 
household’s dwelling. Little difficulty was experienced in obtaining self-
assessed values: owner-occupiers tended to have a good idea of the market value 
of their property.
7 This suggests some advantages to self-assessment in this form 
of taxation, as against procedures which require independent valuation of all 
dwellings. Prices paid at transactions would provide information which could be 
used to design penalties; and selective auditing of self-assessed valuations could 
also help to ensure that honesty would be the best policy. 
The distributions of property values in England and in Ireland, as measured 
by the banding system used in the UK Council Tax, are set out in Table 1. The 
main difference is that more of the Irish households are close to the average 
(band D). 
The distribution of income in Ireland is broadly similar to that in the UK, with a 
lower share for the bottom quintile and a higher share for the top quintile (Table 
2).
8 One other difference should be borne in mind in interpreting the results. This 
is the difference in the structures of income taxation across the two countries. 
The Irish system in 1987 had a standard rate of 35 per cent, and a much narrower 
standard rate band than in the UK. As a result, the proportion of taxpayers 
paying at higher rates (of 48 per cent and 58 per cent) was much greater in 
Ireland. Furthermore, mortgage interest relief in Ireland was, and is, allowable 
against the top marginal rate; whereas recent changes in the UK have led to its 
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being allowed only at the standard rate of tax. Despite this difference in income 
tax structures, some useful and suggestive insights on the UK debate can be 
gained from the present analysis of Irish data. Some analysis is undertaken using 
a baseline closer to the current UK situation — a standard rate of tax of 25 per 
cent, a top rate of 40 per cent and a wide standard rate band — in order to gauge 
the likely importance of these differences in income tax structures. 
TABLE 1 
Distribution of Property Values, England and Ireland 



















Up to 50  A  19  14  13 
50-65 B  16  15  12 
65-85 C  20  18  20 
85-110 D  17  19  25 
110-150 E  13  20  18 
150-200 F  8  9  7 
Over 200  G  7  5  5 
Sources: England – Hills and Sutherland, 1991, Table 2; Ireland – ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, 
Poverty and Usage of State Services, 1987. 
 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of Equivalised Household Disposable Income, UK and Ireland, 1987 
Percentage of income 
Quintile UK  Ireland 
Bottom 8  7 
2nd 12  12 
3rd 16  16 
4th 23  23 
Top 41  42 
Notes: Equivalence scales – UK: McClements scale (see McClements (1977)) (before housing costs); Ireland: 1 
for head of household, 0.66 for other adults, 0.33 for dependent children. 
Sources: UK – CSO, 1990, Table O, p. 94; Ireland – Callan and Nolan, 1992, Table 3. 
The UK poll tax (or Community Charge) raised about 1.8 per cent of UK 
GDP in 1990. Translated into the Irish context, this requires that the tax should Fiscal Studies 
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raise approximately Ir£335 million. Thus, in the analysis of imputed income tax 
and council tax as replacements for the poll tax, each tax is required to raise this 
amount of revenue. This required a poll tax level of Ir£212 per adult, or an 
average council tax of Ir£527 per household (the ratio between the average 
council tax and poll tax being somewhat higher in Ireland than in the UK 
because of greater average household size). Imputation to owner-occupiers of 
income at the rate of 3 per cent of net equity, which would be liable to income 
tax in the normal way, was found to be revenue-neutral, if mortgage interest 
relief was abolished, i.e. 60 per cent of the total imputed income from owner-
occupation is treated as taxable. This helps to give an idea of the distributional 
impact of a more limited imputed income tax, but the income ranking is still 
based on the full imputed income of 5 per cent of net equity. 
The income support rate for the rebate scheme (used in all options apart from 
that of taxing imputed income) was set to correspond with the lowest rate of 
payment in the Irish social welfare system (Supplementary Welfare Allowance).
9 
The equivalence scales used to adjust incomes for households of different sizes 
and compositions were derived from that scheme: 1 for the head of the tax unit, 
0.66 for a spouse and 0.33 for each dependent child. The distributive results are 
presented in terms of income per adult equivalent or ‘equivalised income’, as it 
is usually called in this journal. 
The analysis undertaken here, like that of Hills and Sutherland, is on a ‘first-
round’ basis; second-round effects through changes in the labour supply, demand 
for housing and consequent capital gains or losses are not considered here.
10 The 
analysis also assumes, in line with Hills and Sutherland, that the poll tax is 
incident at individual level, whereas the Council Tax is payable by the 
householder and property taxes (or imputed income tax) by the owner. 
Additional analysis in Callan (1991) of the incidence of a gross property equity 
tax on a household basis shows that while it makes a substantial difference to the 
large number of non-householder tax units, it does not change the broad 
distributional picture of the tax-unit-based analysis undertaken here.
11 
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Figure 1 shows the distributional effects of an imputed income tax, as described 
above, coupled with a reduction in national income tax rates. Two sets of 
calculations are presented. The first measures effects from a baseline given by 
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the three-rate, narrow-band system which operated in Ireland in 1987.
12 From 
this baseline, a reduction of 4.4 percentage points in each of the three tax rates 
was found to be revenue-neutral, when combined with the inclusion of imputed 
income in the tax base. The second set measures effects from a baseline nearer to 
the current UK situation: a two-rate system, with rates of 25 and 40 per cent, 
together with a wide standard rate band. A reduction of just under 4 percentage 
points in the standard rate band was found to be revenue-neutral in this analysis, 
with the top rate being held constant. 
FIGURE 1 
Distributional Impact of Imputed Income Tax and Revenue-Neutral Income Tax Cut 
 
It is readily apparent that the patterns of average gain and loss are quite 
similar under each of these scenarios. There are losses in the second to the 
seventh deciles, and gains in the top three deciles, particularly in the top two. 
The reduction in progressivity associated with the reductions in income tax rates 
tends to outweigh the increase in progressivity associated with the inclusion of 
imputed income in the tax base. The main difference is that the extent of gains in 
the top decile is limited if the tax cut is concentrated on the standard rate of tax. 
Under the UK-style system, the fortunes of the top decile under a standard rate 
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tax cut tend to reflect those of top-rate taxpayers. The maximum gain for a top-
rate taxpayer is given by the product of the cut in the standard rate times the 
width of the standard rate band: a critical level of housing equity (net of 
mortgage debt) then divides top-rate taxpayers who gain from those who lose. 
Two proxies which aim to achieve similar effects to those of an imputed 
income tax, but avoid the administrative difficulty of gaining joint information 
on income and housing values for all households,
13 and the political problem of 
explaining the rationale and implementation of the income imputation procedure, 
are examined in Figure 2. The first is a tax on the gross value of owner-occupied 
property, and the second a tax on the value net of the mortgage outstanding (the 
‘net value’ or equity stake). Each is designed to produce sufficient revenue to 
finance the same cut in national income tax rates as the imputed income tax (4.4 
percentage points off each tax rate). This results in a tax rate of 1.75 per cent on 
gross property value, when mortgage interest relief is retained, but just over 1 
per cent of net property values, if mortgage interest relief is abolished. 
FIGURE 2 
Distributional Impact of Gross and Net Property Taxes with Revenue-Neutral 
Income Tax Cut 
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The net and gross property taxes have quite similar distributive effects. These 
effects are also broadly similar to those for the imputed income tax. The main 
difference is that low income deciles fare somewhat better under the rebate 
scheme which is part of the gross and net property tax. This is partly due to the 
fact that the rebate schemes are designed around income support rates which 
allow for the greater needs of larger families, whereas the income tax thresholds 
do not. The trade-off for this support of the lowest income families is an increase 
in the tax-cum-rebate-withdrawal rate for a large number of families: the 15 per 
cent rebate-withdrawal rate translates into a 15 percentage point increase in the 
effective tax rate on income for as many as one in five tax units under a gross 
property tax, or one in eight under a net property tax. Most of these tax units 
have incomes below the income tax threshold, but may be facing other benefit 
withdrawal rates within the income maintenance system. Increases in marginal 
tax rates under the imputed income option are more limited, being confined to 
those whose imputed income brings their total income above the tax threshold, 
or pushes them into a higher tax bracket. 
FIGURE 3 
Distributional Impact of Imputed Income Tax or Council Tax Replacing Poll Tax 
 
An alternative perspective on the distributional impact of an imputed income 
tax can be gained by modelling a more limited imputed income tax, sufficient to Fiscal Studies 
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finance the abolition of a poll tax. The results, together with those of a council 
tax, are shown in Figure 3. In order to maintain revenue neutrality, a reduction in 
the real rate of return imputed to owner-occupiers is necessary, from 5 per cent 
to 3 per cent. Thus income tax is imposed on only three-fifths of the ‘true’ 
imputed income, in this package.
14 
By contrast with the earlier results, a package involving taxation of imputed 
income to finance the abolition of a poll tax is clearly progressive. There are 
average gains for the lower and middle income deciles, and losses in the top two 
deciles, with the largest loss being in the top decile. The council tax is also found 
to have progressive effects, though not as strong as the imputed income tax. 
Average gains in the low and middle income groups are greater under an 
imputed income tax, while average losses in the top decile are substantially 
greater. 
FIGURE 4 
Distributional Impact of Council tax Replacing Poll Tax on Cash and ‘Total’ 
Income Distributions 
 
How do the distributional pictures using cash and ‘total’ income distributions 
differ? These differences are illustrated for the analysis of a council tax 
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replacing a poll tax in Figure 4. They show average gains under the ‘total’ 
distribution which are no smaller than those for the cash distribution for all but 
one of the lowest eight deciles, and larger losses for the top two deciles. No 
‘total’ income decile below the ninth experiences an average loss, whereas the 
seventh and eighth deciles of the cash distribution show average losses. Thus the 
impact of the council tax is more progressive in terms of ‘total’ income than in 
terms of ‘cash’ income, because of the relationship between the property value 
bands used in the council tax, and net equity/imputed income. 
Average gains and losses, as examined thus far, do not give a full picture of 
the complexity of the distributive effects. Table 3 summarises proportions of tax 
units gaining and losing under the alternative schemes, and highlights the extent 
of large losses. Under an imputed income tax with a revenue-neutral income tax 
cut, the number of gainers exceeds the number of losers, though not by a large 
margin. This margin is reversed in the case of an income tax cut financed by a 
net property tax, while in the case of a gross property tax, the gainers are 
substantially outnumbered by losers. Losses of 5 per week or more are quite 
common under each scenario, and there are significant numbers of losses above 
10 per week under the imputed income tax or net property tax. The extent of the 
large losses for the imputed income tax and the net property tax partly reflect the 
considerable restriction of mortgage interest relief which they involve. This 
would be somewhat lower in the UK setting, where the relief is only allowable at 
the standard rate of tax and that standard rate is considerably lower than the rate 
applicable in Ireland in 1987. There are substantial numbers of large gains 
counterbalancing the large losses. But the large losses are spread across the 
upper half of the distribution, peaking in the upper middle reaches, while the 
gains are concentrated in the top two deciles. 
TABLE 3 
Gainers and Losers 
Percentage losing 
more than: 
Option  Percentage of tax 
units gaining 
Percentage of tax 
units losing 
Ir£5 Ir£10 
Revenue-neutral income tax cut         
Imputed income tax   32  28  12  5 
Net property tax  31  35  10  3 
Gross property tax   29  37  11  1 
Poll tax abolition         
Council tax  33  28  6  0.1   
Gross property tax   48  23  11  4 
Net property tax  48  22  10  5 
Imputed income tax  57  22  12  6 
Notes: The counts of gainers and losers exclude gains and losses of less than 50 pence per week. Fiscal Studies 
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The lower panel of the table, illustrating the extent and frequency of gains 
and losses when revenues are used to abolish a poll tax instead of reducing 
income tax rates, shows quite different results. A council tax leads to a small 
excess of gainers over losers; Hills and Sutherland’s analysis of UK data found 
almost equal numbers of gainers and losers. But the balance between gainers and 
losers would increase by about 25 percentage points under either of the property 
tax options. Gainers outnumber losers by an even greater proportion under an 
imputed income tax. Correspondingly, of course, the numbers experiencing large 
losses also increase. The imputed income tax involves losses of over 5 for 12 per 
cent of tax units, and of over 10 for 6 per cent of tax units; but in this case of poll 
tax abolition, these large losses are concentrated at the top of the income 
distribution. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The distributive impact of a tax on imputed income from owner-occupation 
depends crucially on the use to which such revenue would be put. If an imputed 
income tax were to replace revenues gained from a poll tax or the UK-style 
council tax, the package would tend to favour low and middle income groups. 
But a revenue-neutral reduction in national income tax rates could tend to favour 
upper income groups. Taxes on the value of owner-occupied property (either 
gross or net of mortgage debt, depending on the tax treatment of mortgage 
interest) could result in similar distributive effects if coupled with an income-
related rebate. All of these possible reform packages would involve substantial 
numbers of large gains and losses: the number and size of the losses have clearly 
been a factor in the political unwillingness to consider such options, despite their 
attractions from an economic standpoint. 
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